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JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Appellant asserts the following four issues on appeal:
1. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in not recognizing the legal right of
Cache Valley Bank to setoff1 the Construction Associates bank account?
Standard of Review: Statutory interpretations are questions of law which
the Court of Appeals may review for correctness. Guardian State Bank v. Lambert,
834 P.2d 605, 606-07; (Utah App. 1992).
Preservation of Issue: This issue is preserved by appeal from the trial
court's Order which included the determination set forth.
2. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in extending the scope of a Writ of
Garnishment to subsequent bank deposits made by Construction Associates?
Standard of Review: Errors in legal conclusions and rules of procedure
are questions of law which the Court of Appeals may review for correctness. Brown v.
Glover, 16 P.3d 540, 544 (Utah 2000). N.A.R., Inc. v. Walker, 37 P.3d 1068, 1069
(Utah App. 2001).

1

The words "setoff and "offset" are synonymous. Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed.
2004). "[CJourts use the terms 'offset1 and 'setoff interchangeably, often switching
between themfromsentence to sentence, supporting the conclusion that there is no
substantive difference between them.1' 4 Ann Taylor Schwing, California Affirmative
Defenses 2d § 44:1, at 4-5 (1996).

Preservation of Issue: This issue is preserved by appeal from the trial
court's Order which included determination of the issue set forth.

3. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in granting attorneys fees to Bud Bailey
Construction?
Standard of Review: The award of legal fees was based upon legal
conclusions and an interpretation of the Rule 64D, Utah R. Civ. P. Legal conclusions
and interpretations of statutes are questions of law which the Court of Appeals may
review for correctness. Brown v. Glover, 16 P.3d 540, 544 (Utah 2000). N.A.R., Inc. v.
Walker, 37 P.3d 1068, 1069 (Utah App. 2001).
Preservation of Issue: This issue is preserved by appeal from the trial
court's Order which included determination of the issue set forth at Section 15.

4. Issue: Whether service of the Writ of Garnishment upon Cache Valley
Bank complied with Rule 4?
Standard of Review: Interpretation of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
are questions of law which the Court of Appeals may review for correctness. Brown v.
Glover, 16 P.3d 540, 544; 2000 UT 89 (Ut 2000). N.A.R., Inc. v. Walker, 37 P.3d
1068, 1069; 2001 UT 98 (Utah Ct. App. 2001).
Preservation of Issue: This issue is preserved by appeal from the trial
court's Order which included determination of the issue set forth at its Section 3.

DETERMINATIVE LAW
Issue 1: Whether the trial court erred in not recognizing the legal right of
Cache Valley Bank to setoff the Construction Associates bank account?
§70A-9a-104. Control of deposit account.
(1) A secured party has control of a deposit account if:
(a) the secured party is the bank with which the deposit account is
maintained;
• ••

(2) A secured party that has satisfied subsection (1) has control, even if
the debtor retains the right to direct the disposition of funds from the
deposit account.
§70A-9a-108. Sufficiency of description.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (3), (4), and (5), a
description of personal or real property is sufficient, whether or not it
is specific, if it reasonably identifies what is described.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (4), a description of
collateral reasonably identifies the collateral if it identifies the
collateral by:
(1) specific listing;
(2) category;
(3) except as otherwise provided in subsection (5), a type of
collateral defined in this title;
(4) quantity;
(5) computational or allocational formula or procedure; or
(6) except as otherwise provided in Subsection (3), any other
method, if the identity of the collateral is objectively determinable.
«• •

§70A-9a-203. Attachment and enforceability of security interest Proceeds - Supporting obligations - Formal requisites.
(1) A security interest attaches to collateral when it becomes
enforceable against the debtor with respect to the collateral, unless an
agreement expressly postpones the time of attachment.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (c) through (i), a
security interest is enforceable against the debtor and third parties with
respect to the collateral only if :
(a) value has been given;
(b) the debtor has rights in the collateral or the power to transfer
rights in the collateral to a secured party; and

(c) one of the following conditions is met:
(iv) the collateral is deposit accounts, electronic chattel paper,
investment property, or letter-of-credit rights, and the secured
party has control under Section 9-104, 9-105, 9-106, or 9-107
pursuant to the debtor's security agreement.
§70A~9a-312 Perfection of security interests in chattel paper,
deposit accounts, documents, goods covered by documents,
instruments, investment property, letter-of-credit rights, and
money - Perfection by permissive filing - Temporary perfection
without filing or transfer of possession.
(I)-..
(2) Except as otherwise provided in Section 70A-9a-315(c) and (d) for
proceeds:
(a) a security interest in a deposit account may be perfected only by
control under Section 70A-9a-314;
§70A-9a-314 Perfection by control.
(1)A security interest in investment property, deposit accounts, letterof-credit rights, or electronic chattel paper may be perfected by control
of the collateral under Section 70A-9a-104, 70A-9a-105, 70A-9a-106,
or70A-9a-107.
(2) A security interest in deposit accounts, electronic chattel paper, or
letter-of-credit rights is perfected by control under Section 70A-9a104, 70A-9a-105, or 70A-9a-107 when the secured party obtains
control and remains perfected by control only while the secured party
retains control.
§70A-9a-315. Secured party's rights on disposition of collateral and
in proceeds.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this article and in Section 70A-2403(2):
(a) a security interest or agricultural lien continues in collateral
notwithstanding sale, lease, license, exchange, or other disposition
thereof unless the secured party authorized the disposition free of the
security interest or agricultural lien; and
(b) a security interest attaches to any identifiable proceeds of
collateral.

(2) Proceeds that are commingled with other property are identifiable
proceeds:
(1) if the proceeds are goods, to the extent provided by Section 70A9a-336; and
(2) if the proceeds are not goods, to the extent that the secured party
identifies the proceeds by a method of tracing, including application
of equitable principles, that is permitted under law other than this
article with respect to commingled property of the type involved.
(3) A security interest in proceeds is a perfected security interest if the
security interest in the original collateral was perfected.
(4) A perfected security interest in proceeds becomes unperfected on
the 21st day after the security interest attaches to the proceeds unless:
(a) the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) afiledfinancingstatement covers the original collateral;
(ii) the proceeds are collateral in which a security interest may be
perfected byfilingin the office in which thefinancingstatement
has beenfiled;and
(hi) the proceeds are not acquired with cash proceeds;
(b) the proceeds are identifiable cash proceeds; or
(c) the security interest in the proceeds is perfected other than under
subsection (3) when the security interest attaches to the proceeds or
within 20 days thereafter.
(5) If afiledfinancingstatement covers the original collateral, a
security interest in proceeds which remains perfected under Subsection
(4)(a) becomes unperfected at the later of:
(a) when the effectiveness of thefiledfinancingstatement lapses
under Section 70A-9a-515 or is terminated under Section 70A-9a513; or
(b) the 21st day after the security interest attaches to the proceeds.
§70A-9a-327 Priority of security interests in deposit account.
The following rules govern priority among conflicting security interests
in the same deposit account:
(1) A security interest held by a secured party having control of the
deposit account under Section 70A-9a-104 has priority over a
conflicting security interest held by a secured party that does not have
control.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in Subsections (3) and (4), security
interests perfected by control under Section 70A-9a-314 rank
according to priority in time of obtaining control.
(3) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (4), a security interest
held by the bank with which the deposit account is maintained has

priority over a conflicting security interest held by another secured
party.
(4) A security interest perfected by control under Subsection 70A-9a104(l)(c) has priority over a security interest held by the bank with
which the deposit account is maintained.
§70A-9a-340 Effectiveness of right of recoupment or set-off against
deposit aecount
(1) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (3), a bank with which a
deposit account is maintained may exercise any right of recoupment or
set-off against a secured party that holds a security interest in the
deposit account.
(3) The exercise by a bank of a set-off against a deposit account is
ineffective against a secured party that holds a security interest in the
deposit account which is perfected by control under Section 70A-9a104(i)(c), if the set-off is based on a claim against the debtor.
§70A-9a-341. Bank's rights and duties with respect to deposit
account
Except as otherwise provided in Section 70A-9a-340(c), and unless the
bank otherwise agrees in an authenticated record, a bank's rights and
duties with respect to a deposit account maintained with the bank are not
terminated, suspended, or modified by:
(1) the creation, attachment, or perfection of a security interest in the
deposit account;
(2) the bank's knowledge of the security interest; or
(3) the bank's receipt of instructions from the secured party.

Issue 2: Whether the trial court erred in extending the scope of a Writ of
Garnishment to subsequent bank deposits made by Construction Associates?
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 64D. Writ of garnishment
(a) Availability. A writ of garnishment is available to seize property of the
defendant in the possession or under the control of a person other than the
defendant. A writ of garnishment is available after final judgment or after the
claim has been filed and prior to judgment...
•

•

•

(g) Garnishee's responsibilities. The writ shall direct the garnishee to complete
the following within seven business days of service of the writ upon the garnishee:
(g)(1) answer the interrogatories under oath or affirmation;

(g)(2) serve the answers on the plaintiff;
(g)(3) serve the writ, answers, notice of exemptions and two copies of the reply
form upon the defendant and any other person shown by the records of the
garnishee to have an interest in the property; and
(g)(4) file the answers with the clerk of the court.
The garnishee may amend answers to interrogatories to correct errors or to reflect
a change in circumstances by serving and filing the amended answers in the same
manner as the original answers.
(h) Reply to answers; request for hearing.
(h)(1) The plaintiff or defendant may file and serve upon the garnishee a reply
to the answers and request a hearing. The reply shall be filed and served within 10
days after service of the answers or amended answers, but the court may deem the
reply timely if filed before notice of sale of the property or before the property is
delivered to the plaintiff. The reply may:
(h)( 1 )(A) challenge the issuance of the writ;
(h)(1)(B) challenge the accuracy of the answers;
(h)(1)(C) claim the property or a portion of the property is exempt; or
(h)(1)(D) claim a set off.
(h)(2) The reply is deemed denied, and the court shall conduct an evidentiary
hearing.
(h)(3) If a person served by the garnishee fails to reply, as to that person:
(h)(3)(A) the garnishee's answers are deemed correct; and
(h)(3)(B) the property is not exempt, except as reflected in the answers.
(i) Delivery of property. A garnishee shall not deliver property until the
property is due the defendant. Unless otherwise directed in the writ, the garnishee
shall retain the property until 20 days after service by the garnishee under
subsection (g). If the garnishee is served with a reply within that time, the
garnishee shall retain the property and comply with the order of the court entered
after the hearing on the reply. Otherwise, the garnishee shall deliver the property
as provided in the writ,
(j) Liability of garnishee.
(j)(l) A garnishee who acts in accordance with this rule, the writ or an order of
the court is released from liability, unless answers to interrogatories are
successfully controverted.
«• •

(1) Writ of continuing garnishment.
(1)(1) After final judgment, the plaintiff may obtain a writ of continuing
garnishment against any non exempt periodic payment. All provisions of this rule
apply to this subsection, but this subsection governs over a contrary provision.
•• •

Issue 3: Whether the trial court erred in granting attorneys fees to Bud Bailey
Construction?
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 64D(j)(2)
(j) Liability ofgarnishee.
(j)(2) If die garnishee fails to comply with this rule, the writ or an order of the
court, the court may order the garnishee to appear and show cause why the
garnishee should not be ordered to pay such amounts as are just, including the
value of the property or the balance of the judgment, whichever is less, and
reasonable costs and attorney fees incurred by parties as a result of the garnishee's
failure. If the garnishee shows that the steps taken to secure the property were
reasonable, the court may excuse the garnishee's liability in whole or in part.
Issue 4: Whether service of the Writ of Garnishment on Cache Valley Bank
complied with Rule 4?
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4. Process.
(d) Method of Service. Unless waived in writing, service of the summons and
complaint shall be by one of the following methods:
•»•

(d)(1)(E) Upon any corporation not herein otherwise provided for, upon a
partnership or upon an unincorporated association which is subject to suit under a
common name, by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to an
officer, a managing or general agent, or other agent authorized by appointment or
by law to receive service of process and, if the agent is one authorized by statute to
receive service and the statute so requires, by also mailing a copy of the summons
and the complaint to the defendant. If no such officer or agent can be found within
the state, and the defendant has, or advertises or holds itself out as having, an
office or place of business within the state or elsewhere, or does business within
this state or elsewhere, then upon the person in charge of such office or place of
business;

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case is a legal dispute over garnishment rights and bank setoff rights. This
matter deals with the efforts of Bud Bailey Construction, the judgment creditor, to
garnish the bank deposit account of Construction Associates, the judgment debtor.
The bank deposit account was at Cache Valley Bank, the Appellant herein.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
Bud Bailey Construction applied for and obtained the issuance of a Writ of
Garnishment which was delivered to Cache Valley Bank on November 1,2006. (R.
98-100) Cache Valley Bank made its answer to the Writ of Garnishment on
November 6,2006, stating that $17,901.94 was in the checking account of judgment
debtor, Construction Associates. (R. 101-105) Construction Associates did not file
any reply or request a hearing. The Bank remitted no funds to Bud Bailey
Construction.

2

The term "delivered" is used to raise the issue as to whether service was proper on
Cache Valley Bank. In that Response, the Bank argued that service of the Writ and
Order were both defective as they were not served on the Bank's registered agent or
even an officer or manager of the Bank as required by Rule 4(d)(1)(E). (R. 136, #2 &
#3) See, Constables Reports showing service respectively on Lori Parker and Heather
Dahle. (R. 105-111,122-132) Bud Bailey Construction argues that service on line
employees is adequate for service of process. (T. 185, 187-188) Bank officers and
legal counsel were hampered by this failure to make proper service as required by
Rule 4(d)(1)(E). This is discussed in the Argument at Part IV.

On January 23 , 2007, Bud Bailey Construction made a Motion for Order to
Show Cause in re Contempt directed to Cache Valley Bank. The Order was issued by
the Court and delivered3 to Cache Valley Bank. (R. 112-121) A hearing was held on
February 12th, 2006, and after some confusion about notice4, the Bank appeared
telephonically. By telephone counsel for the Bank explained that the Bank had a
perfected security interest in all bank accounts. (R. 133-134) The hearing was reset
for February 26th, 2007, and at that time Cache Valley Bank filed its written Response
to the Garnishment and Order to Show Cause in re Contempt. (R. 135-158) In
addition to contesting that proper service had occurred, the Bank claimed that it had
an unlimitedrightto setoff the bank deposit account and that it had done so upon
receiving the Writ of Garnishment. The Bank provided evidence in the form of
Exhibits to its Response that it had a number of loans to Construction Associates, all
of which were delinquent and in default. The Bank's Response noted that the notes
and security agreements with Construction Associates provided that the Bank was
given an unlimited right to setoff any bank deposit funds. Further, that it was secured
on the bank deposit funds by reason of security agreements and its position as the
Bank holding the deposit accounts. Documents supporting all these claims were
attached to the Bank's Response. (R. 135-158)
At the hearing of February 26 , the District Court questioned whether the Bank
had waived its interest by fully responding and paying an earlier Garnishment in this

3
4

id.
id.

same matter. (R. 159-160) The Bank filed a Supplemental Memorandum as to that
issue on March 13th, 2007, and also an Affidavit with an attached Exhibit A showing
the activity in the bank deposit account of Construction Associates from November 1,
2006 through February 28,2007. (R. 202-232)
Bud Bailey filed a Reply Memorandum on March 26th, 2007, admitting most of
Cache Valley Bank's Statement of Facts but contesting many of the legal
interpretations5 of the language in the Exhibits attached thereto. (R. 181-201). Cache
Valley Bank filed Supplemental Exhibits on March 29th, 2007. (T. 202-232) The
District Court held its hearing on this matter April 2,2007, receiving legal argument
from both parties. Hearing Transcript pages 1-9, Second Addendum to Brief.
The trial court's Order was entered on May 9, 2007. (R. 234-243, First
Addendum to Brief). The Order provides as follows:
(1) the Bank failed to state it was offsetting in its response of November
6 and was not in compliance with the garnishment statute as of January 25th,
when the trial court issued its Order to Show Cause.
(2) the Bank did offset all the bank deposit funds of $17,901.94, on
November 17, 2006.6
(3) after November 1,2006, an additional $41,789.52 was deposited to
the bank deposit account through February 28,2007.

5

See Bud Bailey Construction Reply, pages 2-9. (R. 182-189).
The funds were setoff from the deposit account on November 1, 2007, moved to the
suspense account and then paid on the Construction Associates loan on November 17.
(R. 202-232)
6

(4) the Bank "instead of complying with the garnishment and order of
the Court" allowed Construction Associates "to continue to write checks from
said account(s) [after November 6] and did allow those checks to clear Cache
Valley Bank to pay third-parties while the valid garnishment of Bud Bailey
was in place."
(5) the Bank's acts were "circumventing a valid judgment and valid
garnishment"
(6) the Bank's actions "violated the Order of this Court and as a result
Garnishee Cache Valley Bank is in Contempt of the Order to Show Cause
dated January 25,2007."
(7) Garnishee Cache Valley Bank is "ordered to pay the sum remaining
Oil U1C UcUiilSIllllClll ill UIV a m o u n t u i i p j o , / U 7 . / i p i u o i ; u u uuLi^y
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fees... in the amount of $2,279.40."
Cache Valley Bank timely filed its appeal from this Order on June 8, 2007. (R. 244257)

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The trial court made no formal Findings of Fact in this matter. However,
undisputed facts can be gleaned from the Order entered and the various pleadings and
exhibits provided to the trial court.
1.

Bud Bailey Construction obtained a default judgment against

Construction Associates on April 5th, 2006. (R. 72-74)

2.

Construction Associates had a deposit checking account with Cache

Valley Bank, Account #65-025454. (R. 176-180)
3.

Bud Bailey Construction caused to be issued a Writ of Garnishment

against that deposit account and any other accounts of Construction Associates at
Cache Valley Bank on October 19th, 2006. (R. 235)
4.

The Writ of Garnishment was delivered to Lori Parker, an administrative

assistant/secretary at the Bank on November 1st. (R. 235)
5.

Ms. Parker is not a registered agent, manager or officer of Cache Valley

Bank. (R. 136,163-65, 187-88)
6.

The Cache Valley Bank's registered agent is this counsel, N. George

Daines at 108 North Main, Logan, Utah 84321. (R. 136, 163-65)
7.

Ms. Gunnell, a bookkeeping assistant, responded with the Bank's

Garnishee Answers on November 6th, 2006, stating that the Bank on November 1st,
2006, had $17,901.94 in the said account. Ms. Gunnell did not answer Question #3.
(R. 101-104)
8.

On November 1st, 2006, Cache Valley Bank setoff the total amount in the

account of $17,901.94 to its Suspense Account and then applied that sum against a
loan owed by Construction Associates, Loan #51-027480, on November 17th, 2006.
(R. 214,216)
9.

As of November 1st, 2006, Cache Valley Bank had three loans owed to

it by Defendant Construction Associates dba KRT Drywall, all of which were
delinquent and in default as of that date; to wit:

a.

Note dated September 13,2000, amount of 150,000.00. (R. 140-41)

b.

Note dated July 10, 1998, amount of $125,000.00. (R. 142-143)

c.

Note dated November 7, 2002, amount of $46,300.00. (R. 211-212)

10. All three Notes were secured by security interests by Commercial
Security Agreements covering bank accounts, instruments, chattel paper, all contract
rights, all retention amounts, claims and causes of action. Said security interests were
duly filed. (R. 146-158,209,)
11. That Defendant Construction Associates, Inc. dba KRT Drywall was in
default on all three Notes as of November Ist, 2006. (R. 216-218, 220-222,224-227)
12. That each of the loan agreements specifically granted the Bank a right of
setoff; to wit: "I agree that you may set off any amount due and payable under this
note against any right I have to receive money from you." See back side of each Loan
Agreement, section highlighted as "SET-OFF". This right is also repeated in the
section relative to "REMEDIES." (R. 143, 145, 212)
13. The security agreement dated November 7th, 2002, among other
designations of collateral has a box next to "Deposit Accounts" marked with an "X"
to signify that all of the bank deposit accounts of Construction Associates are security
for the loan obligations owed to Cache Valley Bank. (R. 206)
14. The other security agreements also list, on thefrontpage of each, the
accounts of Defendant Construction Associates dba KRT Drywall are security for the
aforesaid loans. On the back of each sheet under "REMEDIES" and elsewhere in this
document Cache Valley Bank is formally given the right to setoff funds in its bank

deposit accounts. (R. 146-155)
15. Notice of all of the security agreements were duly filed with Financing
Statements with the State of Utah and are duly on record. (R. 157-58, 209)
16. All of the deposits into the bank deposit account of Construction
Associates were proceedsfromits accounts receivable and, as such, were also
proceeds from the secured accounts receivable of Construction Associates, duly
secured as such to Cache Valley Bank. Id.
17. That on the date November 1, 2006, there was in account #65-0254-54 the
balance of $17,901.94. (R. 176)
18. The next deposit to said account was made by Construction Associates on
November 7th, 2006. (R. 176, also see spreadsheet at Section II, pages 32-33 hereof)
19. That after the garnishment was issued and served and returned,
Construction Associates deposited to that account an additional total of $41,789.52.7
(R. 236)
20. After the date of November 6th, the Bank allowed Construction Associates
to make further payments by checks drawn on the said deposit account. (R. 236 also
see spreadsheet at Section II, pages 32-33 hereof)
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The sum subsequently deposited to the account was actually $45,371.88, but the
difference between these amounts is not material as the balance owing to Bud Bailey
Construction was less than either amount. See Spreadsheet, pages 32-33 of this Brief.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I.

Issue: The trial court erred in not recognizing the legal right of the Cache

Valley Bank to setoff the Construction Associates bank account.
Summary: The trial court failed to recognize that under the provisions of
Revised Article 9 the Bank had "control" of the bank accounts. Based upon that
perfected security interest in the deposit accounts, the Bank was entitled to setoff the
account even after receiving the Writ of Garnishment.

II.

Issue: The trial court erred in extending the scope of a Writ of Garnishment to

subsequent bank deposits made by Construction Associates.
Summary: The trial court erred in considering the Writ of Garnishment to
have the nature of a "continuing" lien with a "superior security interest" to subsequent
checks presented against the debtor's bank account. The Bank's position is that the
Writ only applies to funds in the account as of the date it is served or alternatively,
until the answer is made. The Bank's position is that it had no duty to subsequently
segregate or pay over funds coming into the account.

III.

Issue: The trial court erred in granting attorneys fees to Bud Bailey

Construction.
Summary: The trial court's decision to award attorneys fees was derivative
from its errors on the first two issues. The Bank was not in contempt of the court and
no attorneys fees should have been awarded against it.

IV.

Issue: The service of process of the Writ of Garnishment upon Cache Valley

Bank did not comply with Rule 4.
Summary: Service of Writs of Garnishment should be pursuant to Rule 4. The
Bank was not served properly and as a result any error or shortcoming in its answers
to the interrogatories should be disregarded. When proper notice was given, the Bank
fully explained and defended its right to setoff the funds.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT RECOGNIZING THE LEGAL

RIGHT OF CACHE VALLEY BANK TO SETOFF THE DEBTOR'S BANK
ACCOUNT.
Effective July 1, 2001, Utah adopted the Article 9 revision of the Uniform
Commercial Code. Laws 2000, ch. 252, §177. This Article 9 revision had a number of
salutary effects. One of the principal changes was to make clear what was necessary
to obxain a security interest in a business debtor's bank accounts. The trial court in this
matter wholly failed to recognize that Cache Valley Bank had obtained and held a
valid and perfected security interest in the Construction Associates bank deposit
account.
Prior to the revision, Article 9 excluded from its scope "a transfer of an interest
in any deposit account." It did not prohibit security interests in bank accounts; it
simply left the determinations to each state's non-UCC common law. As a result some
states passed non-uniform laws attempting to bring deposit account security interests
within Article 9. See Barkley Clark, Revised Article 9 of the UCC: Scope, Perfection,
Priorities, and Default, 4 N.C. Banking Inst. 129 (2000); Bruce Markell, From
Property to Contract and Back: An Examination of Deposit Accounts and Revised
Article 9,1A Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 963 (1999).

The present, revised Article 9 provides clear rules for obtaining and perfecting
security positions in commercial8 bank deposit accounts. Cache Valley Bank had
complied with all of these rules with respect to the Construction Associates bank
deposit account on which Bud Bailey Construction attempted to garnish.

1. Cache Valley Bank complied with all rules for attachment of the Construction
Associates deposit account:
Rule 1; Debtor must have rights in the account: Construction Associates
had the normal rights to its regular business checking account at the Bank.
Rule 2; Value must be given for the attachment: Cache Valley Bank's
consideration for its security interest in the deposit account was the granting of loans
to Construction Associates.
Rule 3; Debtor must authenticate a security agreement that describes the
account: Construction Associates executed security agreements that specifically
stated that its "deposit accounts" were security for its loans. See the Commercial
Security Agreement dated 11/7/2002; to wit:

SECURITY INTEREST. To secure the payment and performance of the
Secured Debts, Debtor gives Secured Party a security interest in all
of the Property described in this Agreement...
PROPERTY DESCRIPTION. The property is described as follows:

The Revised Article 9 excludes from its operation consumer deposit accounts.
See §70A-9a-102(a)(26) and §70A-9a-l09(d)(3).

|X| Deposit Accounts: All deposit accounts, including, but not
limited to, demand, time, savings, passbook, and similar accounts.
Commercial Security Agreement. (R. 206). This identification is an adequate
description of the Construction Associates account. See 70A-9a-108(2)(a, b & c).

2. Even if a particular security agreement were not authenticated and/or did not
adequately describe the deposit account attachment will occur because the Bank
had "control" of the Construction Associates deposit account
Pursuant to Section 70A-9a-104, Cache Valley Bank had "control" of the
Construction Associates deposit account:
§70A-9a-104. Control of deposit account
(1) A secured party has control of a deposit account if:
(a) the secured party is the bank with which the deposit
account is maintained;
•• •

(2) A secured party that has satisfied subsection (1) has control,
even if the debtor retains the right to direct the disposition of
funds from the deposit account.
Cache Valley Bank was in "control" because it was a "secured party" and it "is the
bank with which the Construction Associates deposit account is maintained."
Pursuant to Section 70A-9a-203(2)(c)(iv), the lack of authentication and/or
description is cured if the "collateral is deposit accounts" and the "secured party has
control under Section 70A-9a-104." Thus, all of the security agreements of

Construction Associates meet this standard as they refer to security being given to
Cache Valley Bank to all the bank accounts of Construction Associates. (R. 146-155)

3. Cache Valley Bank's security interest in the Construction Associates bank
accounts was perfected.
The revised Article 9 sets forth a streamlined method for banks to perfect their
security interests in the deposit accounts of their business customers. Filing a
financing statement will not perfect security interests in these deposit accounts;
perfection is gained only by "control." Section 70A-9a-312 provides that "(a) a
security interest in a deposit account may be perfected only by control under Section
70A-9a-314." That Section provides that "(2) A security interest in deposit accounts .
.. is perfected by control under Section 70A-9a-104 . . . when the secured party
obtains control and remains perfected by control only while the secured party retains
control."
Cache Valley Bank was perfected in the deposit account of Construction
Associates not because of a "financing statement" but because it was always in
"control" of the deposit account. All of Bud Bailey Construction's arguments to the
trial court that the Bank's financing statement contained inadequate descriptions in its
security agreement or filed financing statements as to the deposits are of no effect. All
Cache Valley Bank needed was the Construction Associates' security agreements to
obtain a perfected security interest in the Construction Associates bank deposit
accounts at Cache Valley Bank.

4. Cache Valley Bank also had a security interest in the Construction Associates
bank account funds because they were proceeds from secured accounts
receivable.
Pursuant to Section 70A-9a-315(3)? (4) and (5), Cache Valley Bank would
have a security interest in any proceeds from Construction Associates accounts
receivable for the statutory time period. All of the deposits into the Construction
Associates deposit account were proceeds from the secured accounts receivable held
by the Bank. Hence, this is another independent basis for the Bank's continuing
security interest in the deposit account.

5. Given the Bank's perfected security interest Section 7QA-9a-34Q grants Cache
Valley Bank the right to setoff against the Construction Associates deposit
account despite receipt of a Writ of Garnishment
Sections 70A-9a-340 and 70A-9a-341 provide that Cache Valley Bank has the
right to setoff the funds in the Construction Associates bank deposit account even
after the Writ of Garnishment is received:
§70A-9a-340 Effectiveness of right of recoupment or set-off against
deposit account
(1) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (3), a bank with which a
deposit account is maintained may exercise any right of recoupment or
set-off against a secured party that holds a security interest in the
deposit account.

§70A-9a-341. Bank's rights and duties with respect to deposit
account.
. . . [Ujnless the bank otherwise agrees in an authenticated record, a
bank's rights and duties with respect to a deposit account maintained with
the bank are not terminated, suspended, or modified by:
(1) the creation, attachment, or perfection of a security interest in the
deposit account;
(2) the bank's knowledge of the security interest; or
(3) the bank's receipt of instructions from the secured party.
The effect of these statutes is to place Cache Valley Bank in the position where it can
setoff the funds in the Construction Associates deposit account even after receiving
the Writ of Garnishment. Indeed, the clear import of these statutes is that the Bank
can ignore the efforts of a "secured party" and/or a party holding a "writ of
garnishment." The Bank here was entitled to setoff the funds and then pay them on
the Construction Associates' delinquent loan. Because the garnishment was not a
"continuing garnishment," the subsequent deposits to the account were not attached
by the Writ of Garnishment served earlier.
However, the clear import of revised Article 9 is that the Bank could refuse to
pay a writ of garnishment against funds in the deposit account, irrespective of whether
it chose to setoff those same funds toward its loans. The Bank is not required to setoff
the funds in the account at all. It could simply refuse to allow any withdrawals of
funds from its secured and perfected deposit account for whatever reason it chose.
However, that is not the case here. The setoff was made and the funds were applied to
a loan.

The trial court erred in finding that the Bud Bailey Construction Writ of
Garnishment created any rights in or to the Construction Associates deposit account at
Cache Valley Bank. The trial court is simply wrong when it suggests that by its Writ
of Garnishment, Bud Bailey established a "superior security interest." Hearing
Transcript at page 9, line 8, Second Addendum to Brief.
The Bank was fully within it rights to setoff the full amount in the account on
November 1,2006. Bud Bailey Construction could not attach the account, perfect any
interest therein nor pursuant to Utah law establish any "control" of the account. Thus
Cache Vaiiey Bank's inteiest in the deposit account was at all times superior to that of
Bud Bailey Construction's Writ of Garnishment.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXTENDING THE SCOPE OF A

WRIT OF GARNISHMENT TO SUBSEQUENT BANK DEPOSITS MADE BY
CONSTRUCTION ASSOCIATES.
This proceeding started with Bud Bailey Construction's claim that it was
entitled to the amount in the Construction Associates bank deposit account of
$17,901.94 on November 1,2006. (R. 102, 112) Cache Valley Bank was ordered to
show cause why it should not be held in contempt for not remitting those funds. The
Bank appeared and defended its position that it was entitled to setoff those garnished
funds against its own loans to Construction Associates. The proceeding then morphed
into a different issue raised by the trial court, the Bank's responsibility as to
subsequent funds deposited in the account. And, as to those funds the trial court found

the Bank responsible to pay over these funds to the amount of the remaining
judgment. As a result of that reasoning, a judgment in the amount of $38,769.71 was
lodged against the Bank. The trial court's reasoning was that after the Writ of
Garnishment was received and answered, the Bank still had a continuing duty to take
subsequent deposits and either pay them to itself or remit them to Bud Bailey
Construction. The trial court's reasoning was that by reason of the Writ, Bud Bailey
Construction had established a "superior security interest" as against other parties
who later received checks from Construction Associates.9 The trial court found the
Bank responsible for such checks and withdrawals because it allowed checks to be
paid after its knowledge of and response to the Writ of Garnishment.
The trial court's reasoning in arriving at this result is preserved in the Hearing
Transcript. Second Addendum to Brief. It is suggested that the short transcript (10
pages) be read in its entirety. A summary of the trials court's reasoning occurs in an
interchange with Bank counsel, Todd Jenson.
MR. JENSON: So that I'm clear then, what the Court would speaking hypothetically - what the Court would have like to have seen
is on service of the second10 garnishment when the bank set off
9

In response to the trial court's insistence (in error) that subsequent funds must go to
the Writ, as a "superior security interest," bank counsel made an argument that the
Bank was trying to salvage the business with a de facto receivership. That argument
was only made in response to the reasoning errors of the trial court; it has no legal
basis and is not necessary to the defense or appeal arguments made herein. The
Bank's activities in monitoring the account to try and manage funds to finish
construction jobs are not material to any issue herein.
10

The references to "second garnishment" have to do with the fact that the Bank
chose to honor an initial garnishment of Bud Bailey Construction against the

(inaudible) $17,000 and applied it to the loan,fromthen on all other
funds that were received through the bank would go to THE COURT: Yes, I mean, $42,000 came in. If they took
$17,000 for their loan, that's fine but there was still enough money to
pay the garnishment.
MR. JENSON: If the bank had kept the remaining amount to
itself (inaudible) paid out again.
THE COURT: Then if their security interest was superior, yes,
they would have been allowed to do that. I don't have a problem but
money came in, they were on notice of garnishment, they set off their
amount, they protected themselves, they took their $17,000 but there
was $41,000 that came in. There was enough money to pay - protect the
bank and protect the other but unilaterally they decided not to do it. In
fact, they moved ail these other people so that checks could go out and
pay them ahead of their own, ahead of the garnishment that came in that
I believe under the law had a superior security interest.
MR. JENSON: Okay, I can see that. The only difference I see
here is that if the bank had those funds in its control and chose to release
them so they could be paid more THE COURT: No, they didn't have a choice once they received
the garnishment. They either had to take them [the deposits] themselves
or give them to somebody that had a higher security interest. If they
didn't want to protect their own rights - and the people that allowed this
to do it, that controlled this was the bank and now what are they going
to do? Are they going to go to all these individuals and get that money
bankfromthem? No. I mean I know Cache Valley - they're not going
to go to all these people that checks were written and to VISA and
everything else and say we want this money back.
Hearing Transcript at page 8, line 12 through page 9, line 23, Second Addendum to
Brief. The trial court apparently concluded that the Bank did have the right to setoff
Construction Associates bank deposit account. There are no issues as to that "first
garnishment;" the Bank garnished and paid over those funds to Bud Bailey
Construction in the Spring of 2006. However, this does not constitute waiver of any
future rights to refuse to do so.

the original $17,910.94 and any additional funds that it would choose to setoff. The
trial court's judgment against the Bank is based upon the Bank's failure to remit to
Bud Bailey Construction the subsequent funds that were deposited into the account
and not setoff by the Bank. That is how the trial court arrives at the surprising
decision to make the Bank pay the remaining amount of the Bud Bailey Construction
judgment.
Before dealing directly with the legal issue it is important to understand the
timeline of Construction Associates subsequent deposits as to the Writ of
Garnishment:11

Construction Associates Bank Account 65-1)254-54
Description
Credit I Debit
Date
Balance
l-Nov-06 1 Balance in Deposit Account
$17,910.94
l-Nov-06 1 Writ of Garnishment Received
$17,910.94
l-Nov-06 1 Setoff to Bank Suspense Account
$17,910.94
$0.00
2-Nov-06 #74982 - Presented & Refused
$3,015.09 $3,015.09
$0.00 I
6-Nov-06 Bank Responds to Garnishment
$0.00
7-Nov-06 Deposit - Amount to be Corrected 1 $4,927.67
$4,927.67
7-Nov-06 Deposit Correction
-$10.00
$4,917.67
7-Nov-06 Deposit
$2,716.52
$7,634.19
7-Nov-06 Check #74983
$1,553.51 $6,080.68
7-Nov-06 Check #74985
$1,288.71 $4,791.97
7-Nov-06 Check #74992
$39.00 $4,752.97
7-Nov-06 Check #74993
$39.69 $4,713.28
7-Nov-06 Check #74995
$1,812.60 $2,900.68
7-Nov-06 1 Check #74996
1
$1,107.67 , $1,793.01
8-Nov-06 Check #74994
$82.92 i $1,710.09
9-Nov-06 Check #74984
$668.29 $1,041.80
14-Nov-06_[ Deposit^
_
| $10,781.55
$11,823.35
11

(R. 176-180, Deposits and checks are placed in chronological order rather than by
check numbers in the inserted table. The exhibits list checks by check number.)

1 14-Nov-06 1 ACH Debit
14-Nov-06 Check #74988
14-Nov-06 Check #74997
14-Nov-06 Check #74998
14-Nov-06 Check #75111
15-Nov-06 Check #74999
15-Nov-06 Check #75112
16-Nov-06 Check #74987
21-Nov-06 Check #75113
22-Nov-06 Deposit
22-Nov-06 Check #75115
22-Nov-06 Check #74986
27-Nov-06 Check #75116
30-Nov-06 Service Charge
30-Nov-06 Re-presented Check #74982
1 l-Dec-06 Check #75117
l-Dec-06 Deposit
4-Dec-06 Check #75114
6-Dec-06 Check #75118
14-Dec-06 Deposit
14-Dec-06 | Auto Transfer Debit
14-Dec-06 Deposit
15-Dec-06 1 Deposit
15-Dec-06 Check #75121
15-Dec-06 Check #75124
18-Dec-06 Check #75122
18-Dec-06 Check #75125
4-Jan-07 Check #75128
TOTAL AFTER RESPONSE

$4,765.00
$918.63
$14.40
$976.50
$1,107.82
$248.75
$1,288.71
$269.33
1
$80.80
$6,415.67
$1,107.80
1 $104.12
$3,522.28
$1.73
$3,015.09
$1,107.82
$2,025.00
$192.00
$1,288.71
$11,704.32
$11,704.32
$203.70
$6,607.45
$1,107.80
$1,107.82
$1,288.71
$1,288.71
$1,107.81
[ $45,371.88 $44,207.05

$7,058.35
$6,139.72
$6,125.32
$5,148.82
$4,041.00
$3,792.25 ,
$2,503.54
$2,234.21
$2,153.41
$8,569.08
$7,461.28
$7,357.16
$3,834.88
$3,833.15
$818.06
-$289.76
$1,735.24
$1,543.24
$254.53
$11,958.85
$254.53
$458.23
$7,065.68
$5,957.88
$4,850.06
$3,561.35
$2,272.64
$1,164.83J

On the date that the Writ was received by the Bank, there was $17,910.94 in
the account. That sum was takenfromthe account to suspense. On November 17 ; it
was taken from suspense account and applied to Bank Loan #51-027480. The Bank
responded to the Writ on November 6th, 2007. Subsequent to that date, as

demonstrated by the table, deposits to the account totaled $45,371.88. The Bank
allowed checks to be drawn against new deposits to the account; these checks through
January 4th, 2007, totaled $44,207.05. The trial court's criticism of the Bank focuses
1 o

not on the setoff which the trial court suggests was allowed but upon the Bank's
payment of these subsequent checks. The trial court believed that by reason of service
of the Writ of Garnishment the Bank was required to regard Bud Bailey Construction
as having a continuing "superior security interest" and, hence, pay over any
subsequent deposits the Bank didn't setoff for itself to Bud Bailey Construction. The
trial court's legal conclusion is as follows:
In fact, they [Bank] moved all these other people so that checks could
go out and pay them ahead of their own, ahead of the garnishment that
came in that I believe under the law had a superior security interest.
Hearing Transcript, page 9, lines 5-8 (emphasis added), Second Addendum to Brief.
The trial court is entirely in error on this point as a matter of law. The service
of a Writ of Garnishment does not create any continuing "superior security interest."
There is a type of garnishment which can constitute a "continuing garnishment" but
that is limited to those situations where there are periodic payments particularly in
those cases involving collection of delinquent child support. Rule 64D(1) provides as
follows:

The trial court opined that this was $42,000. Hearing Transcript at page 8, line 18,
Second Addendum to Brief.
13
Hearing Transcript at pages 8-9, Second Addendum to Brief.

(1) Writ of continuing garnishment.
(1)(1) After final judgment, the plaintiff may obtain a writ of
continuing garnishment against any non exempt periodic payment.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (emphasis added). Pursuant to this Rule continuing
garnishments are limited to "non exempt periodic payments." The Rule sets forth
specific rules that govern how they are to be managed. Rule 64D(1). Typically these
are used for employers who pay periodic wages to employees. Id. When any entity
seeks such a "continuing garnishment" the application must so state. The prescribed
standard form, Application for Garnishment, requires the applicant to mark on its
application if it seeks to have an Order for such a "continuing garnishment." In this
case, Bud Bailey wouldn't be entitled to a "continuing garnishment" because it was
seeking to garnish non-periodic payments, the irregular deposits of Construction
Associates into its bank deposit account. Furthermore, Bud Bailey Construction did
not seek nor did it receive an Order entitling it to such a "continuing garnishment."
An examination of Bud Bailey Construction's Application for Garnishment in this
matter shows that there was no request for a "continuing garnishment."
2. I request that a
X

Writ of Garnishment
Writ of Continuing Garnishment
Writ of Continuing Garnishment for child support

be issued and served upon . . .
Bud Bailey Construction, Application for Garnishment. (R. 99).

There was no legal basis for, nor was there any request for, a "continuing
garnishment" in this matter. Furthermore, Bud Bailey Construction did not seek such
a remedy; it only sought the $17,910.94 in the deposit account on the date of the Writ
of Garnishment was served on the Bank. See Motion for Order to Show Cause. (R.
114) See Bud Bailey Construction's Reply Memorandum which also sought only the
sum of $17,910.94. (R. 194) The trial court, acting on its own volition, imposed upon
the Bank liability to Bud Bailey for the remaining amount of the unsatisfied judgment
of Bud Bailey Construction. The trial court imposed this liability on the Bank because
the Bank allowed Construction Associates to draw checks against subsequent deposits
to its deposit account.
The trial court's ruling that service of a Writ of Garnishment imposes upon the
garnishee a duty to regard the garnishing party as having a continuing lien with a
"superior security interest" is wrong. Utah courts have long held that garnishment
reaches only the property held by the garnishee at the time of service of the Writ of
Garnishment.
By the great weight of authority the liability of the garnishee is limited
to the property of the defendant in the possession or under the control of
the garnishee, and the indebtedness of the garnishee to the defendant at
the time the writ of garnishment is served. The writ does not render the
garnishee liable for property coming into his possession, or
indebtedness incurred after the writ has been served.

Acheson-Harder Co, v. Western Wholesale Notions Co., 72 Utah 323, 325; 269 P.
1032, 1034; 60 A.L.R. 881 (Utah 1928).

The court must ascertain the rights and liabilities of the respective
parties as of the time of the levy of the writ of garnishment... In view
of the documentary evidence, the court should have found that the bank
was indebted to defendant Shire as of the date of the levy of the writ of
garnishment.
Seaboard Finance Co. v. Shire, 117 Utah 546, 218 P.2d 282,287 (1950).
The treatise, American Jurisprudence 2d, notes that these Utah cases are taking
the majority position:
An attachment lien covers only the actual interest or indebtedness
existing at the time of the attachment, and will not reach debts or
property subsequently acquired. Similarly, a writ of garnishment
covers only the property or money of a debtor in the hands of the
garnishee or the indebtedness which the garnishee has a present
obligation to pay to the judgment debtor at the time of the service of the
writ, and nothing beyond that.
6 Am Jur.2d Attachment and Garnishment §488 (2007). (emphasis added). The
minority position is that the time period is extendedfromthe date of service of the
Writ until the garnishee's answer is made. Id. Irrespective of which time period Utah
law requires, the facts in this matter are that the balance in the account between
November 1st and November 6th when the Bank replied, did not change, there were no
deposits in that time period to the balance of $17,910.94. See Spreadsheet, pages 3233.
Following this principle, the Rule 64D provides that the garnishee is "released
from liability" upon filing of the garnishee's answer. Rule 64D(j)(l). That Rule caps
the liability of the garnishee to that time period and imposes no duties as to

subsequent funds or property coming into its possession. There is absolutely nothing
in the Utah Rules of Procedure or Utah case law which suggests that subsequent
deposits or property coming into possession of a garnishee are subject to a continuing
lien or garnishment. Indeed, the rules contemplates that a new garnishment order can
be issued repeatedly. Rule 64D(f). The trial court is wrong in suggesting that the Bank
has some remaining duty after responding to the Writ as to subsequent funds
deposited by Construction Associates. What is more that issue was beyond any
request of Bud Bailey Construction and not properly before the trial court.

III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING ATTORNEYS FEES TO
BUD BAILEY CONSTRUCTION.
The only basis suggested in Rule 64D for awarding attorneys fees against a

garnishee is on the basis that the garnishee failed to comply with the garnishment
rules. See Rule 64D(j)(2). The amount ordered is to be based upon the attorneys fees
incurred by parties as a result of the garnishee's failure. Id. In this matter, the trial
court entered its Order that the Bank pay "Bud Bailey's attorney fees associated with
briefing, preparing and arguing evidence in connection with the third hearing . . . " (R.
251, section 15, First Addendum to Brief) Apparently the basis for this award is that
the trial court found the Bank in contempt for not treating the Writ of Garnishment as
being a "continuing lien" and/or that the Bank did not have the right to setoff the
funds. Apparently, and more precisely the failure of the Bank to remit the entire sum
of $38,769.71, the balance of the Bud Bailey Construction judgment was the basis for

this contempt. This ruling is interesting inasmuch as Bud Bailey never suggested that
this relief was what it sought. The Bank is held in contempt because it didn't pay a
sum wholly determined by the court.
The Court of Appeal's decision on the principal issues in this appeal should
lead directly to a reversal or affirmation of the attorney's fee award. The Bank
believes the award of attorney's fees is wholly unjustified. It is certainly not in
contempt of any court nor its lawful orders.

TV.

THE SERVICE OF THE WRIT OF GARNISHMENT UPON CACHE
VALLEY BANK DID NOT COMPLY WITH RULE 4
This issue is of minor consequence to the present determination of the issues in

this matter. However, the failure of the Bank to properly answer the Writ of
Garnishment initially by claiming its right to setoff should be excused because Bud
Bailey Construction failed to effect proper service.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that corporations be served as
follows:
(d) Method of Sendee. Unless waived in writing, service of the
summons and complaint shall be by one of the following methods:
(d)(1)(E) Upon any corporation not herein otherwise provided for,
upon a partnership or upon an unincorporated association which is
subject to suit under a common name, by delivering a copy of the
summons and the complaint to an officer, a managing or general
agent, or other agent authorized by appointment or by law to
receive service of process and, if the agent is one authorized by statute
to receive sendee and the statute so requires, by also mailing a copy of

the summons and the complaint to the defendant. If no such officer or
agent can be found within the state, and the defendant has, or advertises
or holds itself out as having, an office or place of business within the
state or elsewhere, or does business within this state or elsewhere, then
upon the person in charge of such office or place of business;
Rule 4 (emphasis added). The Bank raised this defense in its initial and
subsequent pleadings. (R. 136, numbered paragraphs 1-3; R. 163-64, numbered
paragraphs #10 and #12; and R. 164-65, Argument, Section I) Bud Bailey
Construction responded in its Reply Memorandum by arguing that the process server
return has printed on it that the person served "represented herself as an authorized
employee of Cache Bank, designated to receive service of such process pursuant to
Rule 4(d)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure with a Writ of Garnishment" as
evidenced by the Constable's Proof of Service attached hereto as Exhibit "B". (R.
187-188, numbered paragraphs 10 & 12, Exhibit "B" is at R. 199, 201) Actually the
returns of service are worded a little differently than represented by Bud Bailey
Construction, they state not that the employee so identified herself but that the
Constable so certifies that the individual is so designated. Id. Courts cannot allow
such efforts by any person to "self certify" or alternatively allow constables to
"certify" individuals to be officers, managing agents or designated agents for service
of process. This is a bootstrap argument; one that attempts to create its own
justification.
Rule 4 requires that service on corporations be upon "an officer, a managing or
general agent, or other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service

of process." The secretary/assistants named by the Constable in these returns are not
officers, managing agents, general agents or other agents authorized by appointment
or by law. They are not such and have never represented themselves as such.
Cache Valley Bank does not intend to make much of this issue. It recognizes
that once it entered an appearance through its legal counsel that it was a party to this
garnishment action and thereby waived, for purposes of the future proceedings any
previous defects in the service of process. But if there is any failure to fully and
completely answer the Writ of Garnishment interrogatories and initially claim setoff,
those failures must be excused by reason of the failure of Bud Bailey Construction to
properly serve process on Cache Valley Bank. Clearly, once the Bank was advised of
the situation correctly, it asserted all of its rights.
This counsel is the registered agent for Cache Valley Bank Pursuant to Rule 47
Bud Bailey could also have served any officers or managing agents of the Bank. The
service of the Writ and the Order to Show Cause was not in accordance with Rule 4
and any failure to answer the interrogatories, initially, should be excused.

CONCLUSION
The trial court apparently accepted the right of Cache Valley Bank to setoff the
funds in the deposit account on November 1,2007. To whatever extent the trial
court's Order does not recognize that right, the Court of Appeals should make a legal
determination. That determination should be that, pursuant to the revised Article 9,
under these facts, Cache Valley Bank had a clear right to setoff all such funds. Cache

Valley Bank had "control95 of the Construction Associates deposit accounts. The
deposit accounts were attached and perfected to its security interest. In addition, any
funds in those accounts were proceeds from collateral (accounts receivable) that were
also security for the Bank's loans. The court should also find that there is no basis on
which the Bud Bailey Construction Writ of Garnishment may be considered a
"continuing garnishment." A "continuing garnishment" was not sought and the Bud
Bailey Construction garnishment is clearly not a "continuing garnishment." Once the
Bank replied to that Writ, it was relieved of any further liability whatsoever. On these
two principal issues the judgment of the trial court should be reversed.
The determination to award attorney's fees award should also be reversed as it
is based upon the trial court's errors on the first two issues. In addition the court
should find there was a failure to follow Rule 4's requirements for service of process.
The Bank's request with respect to that issue is that it not be bound by the incomplete
answers provided. Once the Bank was properly informed of the issues, it responded
appropriately, asserting all its rights to setoff the funds and to claim its rightful legal
position as having a perfected security interest in the deposit accounts.

DATED November 24th, 2007.
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT - FARNIINGTON
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
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CONSTRUCTION ASSOCIATES, INC.
separately and dba as KRT DRYWALL, BUD
BAILEY CONSTRUCTION, INC., LAYTON
POINTE, L.C., and JOHN DOES 1 through
10,
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BUD BAILEY CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
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vs.
CONSTRUCTION ASSOCIATES, INC.
separately and dba as KRT DRYWALL,
Cross-Claim Defendant; and WILLIAM KIM
PITCHER,
Third-Party Defendant.
CACHE VALLEY BANK, Garnishee.

Case No. 050700267
Judge Jon M. Memmott

On April 2, 2007, the Court held a third hearing for the parties to present evidence and
oral arguments regarding Bud Bailey Construction, Inc.'s Motion for Order to Show Cause In Re
Contempt. Cody W. Wilson was in attendance representing Bud Bailey Construction, Inc. (Bud
Bailey") and Todd K. Jensen was in attendance representing Garnishee Cache Valley Bank.
The Court having reviewed the pleadings on file, having heard three oral arguments from the
parties, reviewed all the evidence submitted and for good cause appearing, now finds as
follows:
ORDER
The Court ORDERS, ADJUDGES and DECREES as follows:
1.

Garnishee Cache Valley Bank is in Contempt of the Order to Show Cause.

2.

On October 19, 2006, the Court issued a Writ of Garnishment ordering Cache Valley

Bank to garnish the account(s) of the Third-Party Defendant Construction Associates, Inc. dba
KRT Drywall ("Third-Party Defendant").
3.

On November 1, 2006, the Writ of Garnishment was served on Garnishee Cache Valley

Bank.
4.

On November 6, 2006, Garnishee Cache Valley Bank served a copy of the Writ of

Garnishment, Answers to Interrogatories, Notice of Garnishment and Exemptions form, and two
copies of the Reply and Request for Hearing form on the Third-Party Defendant.
5.

On November 8, 2006, Garnishee Cache Valley Bank filed answers to interrogatories

indicating it was in possession or control of property in which Bud Bailey and Third-Party
Defendant had an interest.
6.

Garnishee Cache Valley Bank failed to provide an offset in its answer to interrogatories

or at any other relevant time as required by law.
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7

On January 25, 2007, at the time the Court issued the Notice and Order to Show Cause,

Garnishee Cache Valley Bank was not in compliance with the garnishment statute as required
by Rule 64 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in that it failed to provide any notice of an offset
or right to offset within the required time period
8.

On or about November 17, 2006, Garnishee Cache Valley Bank took or attempted to

take an offset in the amount of $17,901 94 in the respective account(s) of the Third-Party
Defendant Afterwards Garnishee Cache Valley Bank did not take any further offsets in the
account(s) However, after the garnishment was issued and served an additional total of
$41,789 52 was in the account on deposit by the Third-Party Defendant.
9.

Garnishee Cache Valley Bank then determined that instead of complying with the

garnishment and order of the Court it wanted the money from the account to go to other thirdparties to pay other debts of the Third-Party Defendant and did therefore purposefully move
third-parties debts in front of a valid judgment and in front of a valid garnishment filed by Bud
Bailey
10

Garnishee Cache Valley Bank allowed Third-Party Defendant to continue to write checks

from said account(s) and did allow those checks to clear Cache Valley Bank to pay third-parties
while the valid garnishment of Bud Bailey was in place
11

The funds that Garnishee Cache Valley Bank allowed to go out of the account(s) were in

excess of the garnishment of Bud Bailey
12

Garnishee Cache Valley Bank took or attempted to take what they deemed their own

money and thereafter there were still sufficient funds in the account to pay the valid garnishment
ahead of any third-parties Despite these sufficient funds, Garnishee Cache Valley Bank
allowed third-party debts to be paid circumventing a valid judgment and valid garnishment
Garnishee Cache Valley Bank denoted this action as a "de facto receivership "
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13.

There is nothing in Rule 64 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Uniform Commercial

Code, case law or any agreement submitted to the Court that would allow Garnishee Cache
Valley Bank to create this "de facto receivership" allowing Garnishee Cache Valley Bank to do
what it has done in this case - circumventing a valid judgment and valid garnishment.
14.

The actions of Garnishee Cache Valley Bank violated the Order of this Court and as a

result Garnishee Cache Valley Bank is in Contempt of the Order to Show Cause dated January
25, 2007.
15.

Garnishee Cache Valley Bank is ordered to pay the sum remaining on the Garnishment

in the amount of $38,769.71 plus Bud Bailey's attorney fees associated with briefing, preparing
and arguing evidence in connection with the third hearing regarding Bud Bailey's Motion for
Order to Show Cause In Re Contempt in the amount of $2,279.40. See Affidavit of Attorney
Fees attached hereto as Exhibit "A".
16.

Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Bud Bailey and against Garnishee Cache Valley

Bank in the amount of $41,049.11.
DATED this

day of April, 2007.

SECOND JUDICIAL COURT

HONORABLE JUDGE JON M. MEMMOTT
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P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

We're here to accept argument on the

6

Order to Show Cause and Contempt for the Garnishment.

7

received pleadings, I've reviewed and read them.

8

some supplemental documents received.

9

present oral argument today?

10

MR. NYKAMP:

I have

There was

Both parties want to

What do you want to do?

I don't (inaudible), Your Honor, that

11

I necessarily need to present or oral argument but would be

12

happen to answer any questions —

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. NYKAMP:

15

Okay.
- that Your Honor has.

I think it was

pretty well explained in my brief.

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. JENSON:

Okay.
Your Honor, I'm Todd Jenson

18

representing

19

argument (inaudible) review the bank's position and go

20

(inaudible).

21

Cache Valley Bank (inaudible) present oral

THE COURT:

Maybe I can, Mr. Jenson, have some very

22

specific questions.

I understand the positions you're saying

23

and everything else.

Let me tell you the greatest difficulty

24

I have with the position of the bank is asserting is that

25

they paid the first writ obviously which is I think —

MR. JENSON:
THE COURT:

(Inaudible).
But the second one on November 1 they

said they entered into something called a defacto
receivership.

Now nowhere under the law of garnishment or

nowhere in the documents of any document that I have read
from the bank that I have gone through, do I have this
defacto receivership and I understand receivership in
bankruptcy, I understand receiverships but I don't know what
this defacto receivership is and let me tell you the biggest
issue I have with the bank.

There are, since the date of the

garnishment, 27 checks were allowed to be cleared through the
bank account.

One credit card payment was allowed to clear

through the bank and then one auto transfer debit, I assume
that was a debit card or something like that for $11/000.

So

there was a debit card allowed to clear through the bank.

To

me that would indicate that - and in that amount is
$42,412.48 from after they received the garnishment, they
allowed to be cleared and paid to other parties.

I mean,

when the bank checks clear it's not the bank receiving the
money on their loans or anything else, it's allowing another
party to receive a debt they have against this party and it
appears to me that the bank with this defacto receivership is
deciding as against a court order that these people have the
right to receive the funds ahead of themselves, the bank,
because they're not taking the funds for themselves, I

1

understood if they said, okay, we want an offset, we're

2

closing down this account, we're taking the money to offset,

3

we think there's a danger they're not going to pay and they

4

exercise that.

5

read the documents but I don't understand how they can allow

6

themselves in this defacto receivership to go against a court

7

order and say these other people have a right to get the

8

money instead of us, the bank, and instead of the garnishee,

9

I mean the person that garnished.

I don't have any problem with doing that as I

That's what I don't

10

understand under the law because I can't find that or read

11

that or allow that in anywhere under the law.

12

issue I need to understand.

13

MR. JENSON:

I can go through that.

So that's an

What happened

14

- and in fact, oh, about a year ago is when the bank's served

15

the first garnishment and the bank (inaudible) dropped the

16

ball on that one (inaudible) garnishment and didn't exercise

17

the right (inaudible) at that time.

18

Then in October I believe it was, don't know the

19

exact date, (inaudible) served the second garnishment.

At

20

that time the bank exercised that remedy and they did set it

21

off, they drew it out the account and applied all the funds

22

they could which was about $17,000 towards the loan and

23

that's shown in our supplemental exhibit.

24

one it is. That is shown in Exhibit E of the supplemental

25

exhibit.

Let's see which

You can see there the loan amount is again at the

1

top is $46,300 and then down at the bottom you can see a

2

principle only payment on 11-17 for that amount, $17,000.

3

The bank did allow the debtors to do business but they

4

monitored - it was some time after the first punch list that

5

they began to monitor payments coming in and only allow

6

certain ones to go out.

7

THE COURT:

How could you allow certain to go out

8

if they have a garnishment that the court says comes before

9

the amount they allow to go out?

10

it to go out legally?

11

MR. JENSON:

12

The first garnishment would have

expired after 120 days.

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. JENSON:

I mean, how do they allow

That's under the rule.

Okay.
So after that time the bank, the bank

15

was (inaudible) total of three loans, couple hundred thousand

16

dollars together.

17

they wanted it to keep going.

They didn't want to kill the business,

18

THE COURT:

Okay, okay -

19

MR. JENSON:

So they -

20

THE COURT:

I understand what they did.

Legally

21

how can they do that?

That's my question because I read the

22

cases, I read everything and there's nothing in the law that

23

I can find that allows them to do that once they receive the

24

garnishment.

25

offset, they have monies that they want to claim for

I agree with you that if they have a remedy for

themselves and for their own debts, they can do that and I
don't have any quarrel with that because I think the law
allows that, garnishment and all secured interest.
My question is, how can they be the arbitrator to
decide yes, we want - because when you write a check or a
write a debit card, I mean, you're indebted to somebody but
the people that are indebted to on those accounts don't have
preference in charge of either the bank or Colonial.

They're

not in position in front of them for these funds and yet the
bank by what it's doing is putting them in that position.
That's what I don't understand because they're moving
somebody up by what they do, ahead of the - and you're on
notice not to do that.

I mean, it's not like the bank

doesn't know because this is the second one.

I just wonder

under the law how they can do that?
MR. JENSON:

Okay.

With the second garnishment I

understand that when the bank responded to the second
garnishment, in it's answers, I think it's line 3 in the
garnishment it says, the bank is suppose to declare its
reason for setting off any funds and the bank omitted that
and (inaudible) order to show cause issued.

The bank then

showed that it did have a valid security interest in the
(inaudible) and whatnot then all the funds then would be
under control of the bank; is that not correct?
THE COURT:

If the bank takes them for themselves.

1

MR. JENSON:

2

THE COURT:

Isn't that what the bank did though?
No, it didn't.

It allowed them -

3

that's exactly what I'm saying.

They allowed all these

4

checks to be paid to other parties.

5

VISA/Mastercharge to pay off debts of other parties.

6

allowed this debit card to go to pay off other parties.

7

understand the bank's argument and I understand the security

8

agreement but I've dealt with this and that means the bank

9

has the right to take it off their debts, to offset their

They allowed to a
They
I

10

loans, to offset their payments but they didn't do that.

11

That's the difficulty that I have.

12

They allowed it to be paid to other parties other than

13

themselves and other than Colonial because they decided that

14

could do this in this defacto receivership and that's what

15

I'm saying, that's where I really have problems with the law

16

because there's nothing in the law that I'm aware of that

17

allows them to do that.

18

MR. JENSON:

That's not what they did.

If the bank, however, is controlling

19

what is paid out and why only so that the business can

20

continue to pay, that goes to the bank.

21
22
23
24
25

THE COURT:

What legal authority does it have to do

that?
MR. JENSON:

Well, it's allowed to do that under

its security agreement.
THE COURT:

No, there is no place in the security

agreement that it says it can have a defacto receivership.
What it does is it says it can seize the account and it lists
the items that it can seize and take control of those items
and have them pay their debts but it can't substitute itself
for the court or substitute itself for somebody else and say,
"You know what, I'm going to pay your claim but I'm not going
to allow your claim.

I'm going to move your claim ahead of

this claim because I think that's in my interest to move your
claim ahead of my claim."

I mean, they're taking on a role

here that I think is really unique under the law and I don't
think it's allowed, that's what I'm trying to ask.

I mean, I

understand the agreement and I understand the ability to
offset and I understand the ability for them to say, "You now
what, we don't think this is going to do that and we want to
take all your receivables out to pay our debt because we
don't you're going to be able to pay."

I don't have any

problem with that because that's what they agreed to and
that's what the parties agreed to but that's not what they
did, that's the part that I have the problem with because
that's not what they did.
MR. JENSON:

Okay, I can see that.

From my point

of view if the bank is controlling the funds it's controlling
how they're spent in furtherance of its own interests.

If

the bank is entitled to all of those funds and if they
release funds so they can be paid more in the future, that to

me seems to go right in the line of the bank's authority to
keep all the funds and control it for themself and pay off
debts.
THE COURT:

Then we go back to the question, how

under the law, what section of the law, what section of the
code, what part of the contract, what law in Utah, what
allows them to do this, what banking regulation allows them
to assume that role?

What under the UCC, what position

allows them to determine under the UCC that people that have
security interests ahead of all these other people, that
these other people get to be paid first?
MR. JENSON:

So that I'm clear then, what the Court

would - speaking hypothetically - what the Court would have
liked to have seen is on service of the second garnishment
when the bank set off (inaudible) $17,000 and applied it to
the loan, from then on all other funds that were received
through the bank would go to —
THE COURT:

Yes, I mean, $42,000 came in.

If they

took $17,000 for their loan, that's fine but there was still
enough money to pay the garnishment.
MR. JENSON:

If the bank had kept that remaining

amount to itself (inaudible) paid out again.
THE COURT:

Then if their security interest was

superior, yes, they would have been allowed to do that.

I

don't have a problem but money came in, they were on notice
8

1

of garnishment, they set off their amount, they protected

2

themselves, they took their $17,000 but there was $41,000

3

that came in.

4

bank and protect the other but unilaterally they decided not

5

to do it.

6

checks could go out and pay them ahead of their own, ahead of

7

the garnishment that came in that I believe under the law had

8

a superior security interest.

9

There was enough money to pay - protect the

In fact, they moved all these other people so the

MR. JENSON:

Okay, I can see that.

The only

10

difference I see here is that if the bank had those funds in

11

its control and chose to release them so they could be paid

12

more —

13

THE COURT:

14

they received the garnishment.

15

themselves or give them to somebody that had a higher

16

security interest.

17

rights - and the people that allowed this to do it, that

18

controlled this was the bank and now what are they going to

19

do?

20

that money back from them?

21

they're not going to go to all these people that checks were

22

written and to VISA and everything else and say we want this

23

money back.

24
25

No, they didn't have the choice once
They either had to take them

If they didn't want to protect their own

Are they going to go to all these individuals and get

MR. JENSON:

No.

I mean I know Cache Valley -

Okay, I can see that too if the

position that all the funds that were received by the bank

1

after the date of garnishment, unless the bank put those

2

funds on a direct -

3
4 I

(Original videotape ends at 4:13:49,
Docket shows ending at 4:37)
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